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Arttu Malkamäki a,c,*, Tuomas Ylä-Anttila b,c, Maria Brockhaus a,c, Anne Toppinen a,c, 
Paul M. Wagner b,c,d 
a Department of Forest Sciences, Latokartanonkaari 7, 00014, University of Helsinki, Finland 
b Faculty of Social Sciences, Unioninkatu 37, 00014, University of Helsinki, Finland 
c Helsinki Institute of Sustainability Science, Yliopistonkatu 3, 00014, University of Helsinki, Finland 
d Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, City Campus East, NE1 8ST, Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom   
A R T I C L E  I N F O   
Keywords: 
Advocacy coalition framework 
Belief systems 
Community detection 
Discourse network analysis 
Industrial tree plantations 
Forest landscape restoration 
A B S T R A C T   
Competing coalitions can stabilise policymaking and hinder policy changes that are required to address the 
mounting pressures on land use systems across the globe. Thus, understanding the driving forces of coalition 
formation is important. This paper builds on the Advocacy Coalition Framework to determine the relative 
contributions of two sets of beliefs (more general policy core beliefs and more specific beliefs concerning policy 
instruments) to coalition formation in South African tree plantation politics and to identify coalitions therein. 
Discourse Network Analysis was used to code 656 statements regarding 40 beliefs to create network data from 55 
interviews with organisational elites. Results from a network analysis of the twelve most salient beliefs indicate 
that dissimilar policy core beliefs about the validity of environmental regulation, social costs of tree plantations, 
and the conditionality of land reform in South Africa divide actors into two coalitions: the hegemonic “business- 
as-usual” coalition and the minority “justice and change” coalition. These boundaries were confirmed by 
comparing the network based on shared policy core beliefs with a co-ordination network. Dissimilar beliefs 
concerning policy instruments, including eco-certification and an indicative zoning, also divide actors, yet actors’ 
reasoning for or against these instruments differ to the degree that united fronts are unlikely to form. Hegemonic 
coalitions that combine selected state and business interests with labour arguments and prioritise short-term 
economic efficiency threaten to delay the necessary changes away from business-as-usual across land use sys-
tems in South Africa and beyond.   
1. Introduction 
The state of the global ecosystem continues to decline as a conse-
quence of the increasing exploitation of natural resources by humans 
(Díaz et al., 2019; Erb et al., 2018). This decline threatens the ecological 
processes upon which humanity ultimately depends (Pilling et al., 2020; 
Song, 2018; Steffen et al., 2018). The intensification of land use systems 
across the globe and their connections to global markets have also sit-
uated humanity in a “global production ecosystem” that is highly con-
nected, geared to monoculture production, and vulnerable to 
unexpected and pervasive risks (Keys et al., 2019; Nyström et al., 2019). 
Understanding the factors that either foster or hinder policy change to 
address such challenges is an urgent priority for scholars and practi-
tioners alike. 
Coalitions formed by policy actors to advocate for a common policy 
position have become an important means of political engagement 
(Weible and Ingold, 2018). Actors form coalitions to push for policy 
change, to defend material interests, or to uphold an existing social 
order. It is often crucial for a policy actor to be a member of coalition to 
achieve success in the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). In 
conflictual policy contexts that rarely have clear-cut solutions to prob-
lems, such as those related to land use systems, policy processes tend to 
be shaped by competing coalitions (Pierce et al., 2017). A frequent 
consequence of this is the presence of policy stability for a decade or 
more (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Zafonte and Sabatier, 2004). If a 
hegemonic coalition connects powerful actors and prioritises, for 
example, high and predictable supplies of biomass in the short term over 
long-range sustainability, coalition formation can be the focal social 
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force that holds the existing policies and practices in place. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a well-established lens 
through which researchers can examine how policy actors behave, how 
their beliefs translate into policy, and for investigating whose interests 
policy serves, especially where economic interests collide with social 
and ecological concerns (Sabatier, 1988, 1987). Over the years, it has 
evolved into a generalisable theory of policy change (Wellstead, 2017). 
The ACF argues that subsets of actors that share a set of policy core 
beliefs that are broad in scope, resistant to change, and have been the 
source of protracted conflict will band together to form coalitions. 
However, this theoretical argument has received uneven empirical 
support (Weible et al., 2019). Due to inconsistent operationalisation in 
empirical applications, determining the extent to which actors’ beliefs 
about policy instruments contribute to coalition formation has been 
particularly challenging. 
This paper examines tree plantation politics in South Africa to 
investigate how policy core beliefs and beliefs about policy instruments 
both underpin coalition formation. In South Africa, the politics of tree 
plantations spans a century of conflict fought over the effects that highly 
productive tree monocultures have on biodiversity, wildlife, wildfires, 
streamflow, and for social justice. Various policy instruments are con-
tested, such as the indicative zoning of land for the establishment of new 
plantations. Considering the changes after the end of apartheid in the 
nineties and the then emerging window of opportunity to reform the 
land use sector, there are still persisting challenges rooted in this sector 
in South Africa (and elsewhere, see Malkamäki et al., 2018). This case is 
of particular interest to inform decision-makers on the role of coalitions 
in fostering or hindering policy change in the face of unprecedented 
pressures on land use systems. By focusing on an African country, this 
paper extends the geographical area where the ACF has been applied. To 
date, it has largely been drawn upon analyses of European and North 
American policy processes (Pierce et al., 2017). Using network data 
collected through 55 interviews with organisational elites, this paper 
addresses two specific research questions:  
i) Can we identify competing coalitions based on shared policy core beliefs 
and what is the relative contribution of such beliefs to coalition 
formation?  
ii) Can we identify competing coalitions based on shared beliefs concerning 
policy instruments and what is the relative contribution of such beliefs to 
coalition formation? 
This paper is organised as follows: the next section introduces the 
ACF and its theory of coalition formation. This is followed by a 
description of tree plantation politics in South Africa, our data, methods, 
and results. The paper concludes with a discussion on the implications of 
our findings. 
2. Policy beliefs and coalition formation 
According to the ACF, actors engage in politics to translate their 
beliefs into action. Although actors’ beliefs and material interests are 
highly correlated and the causation tends to be reciprocal (Sabatier, 
1988, p. 142), the ACF suggests that policy actors act according to their 
enduring beliefs rather than their short-term interests (Sabatier, 1993, p. 
27). Because groups of actors may pool critical resources to enhance the 
prospect of a favourable outcome, it rarely makes sense to advocate 
alone (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015). From the perspective of an 
individual actor, the perceived benefits of joining a coalition can be 
substantial if one or more of the coalition members are especially 
influential (Hojnacki, 1997). 
An advocacy coalition consists of actors “who share a particular 
belief system—i.e., a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and prob-
lem perceptions—and who show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated 
activity over time” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). In policy subsystems (i.e., 
domain-specific networks) that are both conflictual and pervasive in 
government (bureaucrats routinely consult with researchers, civil soci-
ety organisations, and interest groups, among others), coalitions 
compete to dominate the policymaking process. This equilibrium tends 
to hold until external perturbations, such as natural hazards or changes 
to constitution, cause coalition members to refine their belief systems 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 193). The resulting policy is often a 
manifestation of hegemonic coalition’s beliefs (Weible et al., 2019). 
The ACF distinguishes between three levels of beliefs (Jenkins-Smith 
et al., 2014). Deep core beliefs are fundamental (e.g., views of human 
nature) and resistant to change (i.e., akin to a religious conversion), but 
often too broad to guide detailed policy. Policy core beliefs are more 
specific, but still resistant to change. They range from value priorities 
and views about whose well-being counts the most (normative) to be-
liefs about the causes and severity of problems (empirical). Secondary 
beliefs relate to policy implementation (e.g., budgetary allocations) and 
are most amenable to change, as actors learn from the effects of earlier 
policies. However, learning is argued to occur through the lens of deeper 
and more resistant beliefs, leading actors in competing coalitions to 
select and interpret information in different ways. 
The ACF explains the endurance of beliefs with its “model of the 
individual” that combines some well-known cognitive biases that govern 
the behaviour of individuals – these include the hierarchical model of 
attitude constraint (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985) and the overestimation 
of political opponents’ malice (Sabatier et al., 1987). However, biased 
assimilation is argued to be the main factor driving self-organised coa-
lition formation around beliefs (Lord et al., 1979): actors tend to inter-
pret information in a way that reinforces their prior beliefs. Actors with 
similar beliefs are understood to be more likely to draw similar in-
terpretations of the same piece of information (e.g., the implications of 
biodiversity loss). Conversely, actors with dissimilar beliefs are more 
likely to draw dissimilar interpretations of that same piece of informa-
tion. Dissimilar interpretations may breed distrust (Leach and Sabatier, 
2005), and because co-ordination necessitates trust, coalition formation 
is more likely to occur among those with similar beliefs than among 
those with dissimilar beliefs. 
Shared deep core beliefs and secondary beliefs may also contribute to 
coalition formation, but shared policy core beliefs are the “stickiest 
glue” that hold coalitions together (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible 
et al., 2019). Despite its intuitive appeal, the ACF’s broad con-
ceptualisation of a policy actor’s belief system can be considered a 
weakness of the framework. On the one hand, the endurance of beliefs is 
dependent on the geographical and substantial context. On the other 
hand, the definitions of the different levels of beliefs in the ACF could 
simply be too wide to allow clear classification. 
Most applications of the ACF classify beliefs about policy instruments 
as secondary beliefs. These may be related to an actor’s policy core 
beliefs, but they are argued to be more empirically based, narrower in 
scope, and thus more amenable to change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
In one exposition of the ACF, Sabatier (1998, pp. 116–117) describes a 
fourth level of beliefs: policy core policy preferences. He contends that 
these can constitute part of the policy core if they have the same features 
as the policy core beliefs (e.g., being broad in scope and having been the 
source of conflict for years). Possibly stemming from such conceptual 
plurality, researchers have operationalised beliefs concerning policy 
instruments somewhat inconsistently in empirical applications. Empir-
ical findings concerning their relative contribution to coalition forma-
tion have as a result been somewhat contradictory. 
In a study of marine life protection politics in California, Weible and 
Sabatier (2005) measured policy core beliefs as both problem percep-
tions and policy instruments. Their operationalisation of policy core 
beliefs predicted the structure of co-ordination networks more accu-
rately than the structure of advice networks. Ingold’s (2011) study of 
Swiss climate politics operationalised beliefs about policy instruments as 
secondary beliefs, which differed from policy core beliefs. She found 
that both were significant drivers of coalition formation. Analysing 
German pension politics through media debates, Leifeld (2013) noted 
A. Malkamäki et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Land Use Policy 102 (2021) 105283
3
that coalitions could form based on shared beliefs about policy in-
struments alone. Conversely, Kukkonen et al. (2017) identified co-
alitions in climate politics of the US based on shared policy core beliefs, 
but not based on shared beliefs about policy instruments. Metz et al. 
(2018), in a study of Swiss water protection politics, show that actors 
tend to reject policy instruments if they co-ordinate their actions with 
many others who also reject the same instrument. They argue that 
engaging in co-ordinated action may cause actors to share beliefs about 
policy instruments, and that the sharing of these beliefs could also lead 
to co-ordination. Following Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) hypothesis and 
subsequent findings, beliefs about policy instruments may thus exhibit a 
reciprocal causation with co-ordination (in contrast to the hypothetical 
unidirectional causation between policy core beliefs and co-ordination 
as the cause and the effect, respectively). 
3. Tree plantation politics in South Africa 
South Africa enacted its first democratic constitution in 1994. Soon 
thereafter, Tewari (2001) identified two coalitions in the tree plantation 
subsystem based on an analysis of policy documents: a commercial 
forestry coalition and an environmental coalition. Dissimilar beliefs 
about water use pricing as a policy instrument was the only policy that 
divided actors. After the flurry of policy reforms that occurred between 
1994 and 2004, the subsystem has become more divisive over the im-
plications of these reforms. Specific issues concern the distribution of 
costs and benefits and the scientific validity of existing policies, whereas 
broader questions of how and to what extent to reconcile economic goals 
with social and environmental concerns largely remain unresolved 
(Bennett and Kruger, 2013; Francis and Webster, 2019; Goldin, 2010; 
Kruger and Bennett, 2013; Masipa, 2018; van Wilgen and Richardson, 
2014; Witt, 2014). 
South Africa hosts an essentially semi-arid grassland biome. Natural 
forests were never abundant in the southern tip of Africa, which allowed 
the early colonial and national governments to embark on large-scale 
planting of alien tree species to supply local uses (Kruger and Bennett, 
2013). Planting of trees in the mountainous watersheds soon led to 
conflicts with downstream water users. The debate on plantations went 
on until the government begun regulating their extent in 1972 based on 
their estimated effects on streamflow. Most of the 1.26 million hectares 
of wattle, pine, and eucalypt plantations are in the provinces of Mpu-
malanga and KwaZulu-Natal (Fig. 1). Some 80 % of those lands are 
under private ownership, 15 % are under public ownership, and the rest 
belongs to communities, many of which are land reform beneficiaries. 
The industry is relatively important for the South African economy by 
contributing positively to foreign trade and job creation in rural areas 
with few alternatives. High rates of unemployment combined with 
relatively generous social protection describe much of everyday life in 
this part of Africa (Zizzamia, 2020). From a low of 53 % in 2011, 56 % of 
South Africa’s 55 million inhabitants were living in poverty by 2015 
(Francis and Webster, 2019). 
After the end of apartheid, many policies were either repealed or 
reformed. The National Water Act of 1998 imposed further regulations 
on tree planting by classifying it as a streamflow reducing activity and 
making it subject to additional fees and water use licensing. The 
Biodiversity Act of 2004 obliged plantation managers to control for 
invasive alien species, some of which are commercial tree crops that 
encroach riparian zones and wetlands (van Wilgen and Richardson, 
2014). Since 1998, very little tree planting has taken place, of which 
consequences an industry that grew powerful and international before 
the enactment of these restrictions is currently experiencing. Plantation 
extent has in fact been shrinking for various reasons, including patho-
gens and wildfires. South Africa falls under the projection of a drier 
climate (Maúre et al., 2018), which is expected to reduce the area 
suitable for plantations and to aggravate the biotic and abiotic damage 
factors (Kraaij et al., 2019; Warburton and Schulze, 2008; Wingfield 
et al., 2013). The South African grasslands have been highlighted as 
hotspots for future conflicts over the use and control of land with water 
(Johansson et al., 2016). 
South Africa has been going through a land reform process under the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994. Those who were either forcefully 
relocated or forced to become labour tenants under the Land Act of 1913 
are entitled to a restitution of that property or to an equitable redress. A 
complication is that most current owners acquired their lands legally 
somewhere between 1913 and present. Whereas the government has 
privatised some of its own plantations, it remains a shareholder on 
behalf of the actual beneficiaries to maintain production and share 
dividends to beneficiaries until they are capitalised to overtake the 
business. However, some contend that this model has diverged from the 
original idea of land reform as a means of wider decolonisation, repro-
ducing the paternalistic relations of the apartheid and reinforcing the 
pernicious logic of a capitalist economy (Cousins, 2019; Kepe and Hall, 
2018). Around 40 % of privately-held tree plantations and 70 % of 
publicly-held tree plantations remain under land claim (Chirwa et al., 
2015). 
The policy instruments specific to the case include voluntary sus-
tainability standards, multi-functional management, and indicative land 
use zoning. We briefly explain these below. 
In 1997, the South African government was one of the first to meet the 
sustainability criteria of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) on its own 
plantations. The National Forests Act of 1998 encouraged the uptake of 
eco-certification to enhance bottom-up sustainability, instead of relying 
on top-down regulatory institutions (Scotcher, 2006). Currently, around 
80 % of the plantations in South Africa are certified under the label of the 
FSC. The criteria stem from an international multi-stakeholder dialogue, 
Fig. 1. Tree plantations in South Africa (own elaboration based on DEA, 2019).  
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which supposedly offers enhanced transparency and accountability. 
Compliance may be rewarded through a price premium, enhanced market 
access, or sustained production (Lambin et al., 2014). 
The idea of managing plantations for functions that are comple-
mentary to wood production has also been under debate. Such functions 
include biodiversity conservation (Samways and Pryke, 2016), carbon 
sequestration (Rahlao et al., 2012), recreation (Dhakal et al., 2012), and 
rural livelihoods (Bussoni et al., 2015; Malkamäki et al., 2016). 
Multi-functionality may also entail reconciliation of conflicts with 
customary or communal land tenure systems (Macqueen et al., 2018). 
While there is little experience of adoption or success on the ground in 
South Africa, the National Forests Act of 1998 endorses such aspirations. 
Approved by the government, business interests, and labour unions, 
the Forest Sector Code of 2009 highlighted the need to “streamline and 
expedite” environmental licensing procedures to facilitate a net increase 
of 100,000 ha in plantation extent in Eastern Cape. It aimed to spur job 
creation and counter a “looming” supply shortage of wood. With slow 
progress on the ground, the Amended Forest Sector Code of 2017 reaf-
firmed this target and listed twelve additional means to achieve it, 
including the “creation of a regulatory environment” that renders the 
costs of environmental licensing affordable. Although Eastern Cape lags 
in socio-economic indicators, it hosts the last unallocated water re-
sources in the whole of South Africa. 
4. Methods 
In this section we outline our methods of data collection, data 
preparation, and data analysis. Additional details are supplied in the 
supplementary file. 
Researchers have used quantitative surveys (Di Gregorio et al., 2017; 
Ghinoi et al., 2018), media materials (Kukkonen et al., 2017; Leifeld, 
2013), policy documents (Heikkila et al., 2014; Tewari, 2001), and 
qualitative interviews (Heinmiller and Pirak, 2017; Sotirov and Winkel, 
2016) to measure actors’ beliefs. We collected our data in South Africa in 
2017 through semi-structured interviews with 55 organisational elites 
that we identified as being involved in the country’s national tree 
plantation politics. 
To ascertain which actors are members of the tree plantation policy 
subsystem in South Africa we began by consulting freely available in-
formation (e.g., trade magazines, policy documents, scientific and grey 
literature, and websites). We then asked three independent experts to 
review the organisations that we identified. Based on their feedback we 
expanded the roster of actors to 59 organisations (Table 1). Four of these 
organisations either declined to be interviewed or could not participate 
due to recent changes in their administration, and as result, they were 
omitted from our analysis. We identified and contacted the organisa-
tional elites (e.g., government commissioners, executive and deputy 
directors, professors and principal investigators, and national and pro-
vincial co-ordinators) through various means, including contact di-
rectories and by using contact information of specific elites provided by 
other elites. By interviewing organisational elites, we ensure that the 
beliefs that we analyse are those of the organisation rather than those of 
the individual. 
We collected data on organisational beliefs by asking the elites to set 
out their preferred vision for the future of tree plantations in South Af-
rica and by asking them to elaborate on their realistic expectations. We 
then asked them to cite any challenges that they saw as barriers to 
realising their vision. We also asked specific questions about the con-
sequences and feasibility of indicative zoning in Eastern Cape and about 
the quality of the policymaking process and the resulting policies in the 
subsystem (see the supplementary file for the exact formulations of the 
questions). By using open-ended questions, we accepted that in-
terviewees would give different degrees of detail when answering our 
questions, which would make comparisons more challenging (Creswell 
and Creswell, 2019). However, the advantage of this approach is that it 
allowed us to tease out the tensions between the different framings and 
meanings attached to the policy beliefs in the subsystem (Hajer, 1995). 
The elites were inclined to bring forward the issues most salient to them. 
This followed the commonly observed reality where some coalition 
members work on and articulate views on multiple issues while others 
occupy more auxiliary or specialised roles in advocacy (Hojnacki, 1997; 
Weible et al., 2019). 
Table 1 
Roster organisations.  
Government departments and 
agencies 
Scientificorganisations 
g1. Dept. of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries 
s1. Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research; Nat. Res. and the Environment 
g2. Dept. of Environmental Affairs s2. Forestry & Agricultural Biotechnology 
Institute 
g3. Dept. of Rural Development and 
Land Reform 
s3. Institute for Commercial Forestry 
Research 
g4. Dept. of Science and 
Technology; National Research 
Foundation 
s4. Nelson Mandela University; School of 
Natural Resource Management 
g5. Dept. of Trade and Industry s5. Univ. KwaZulu-Natal; Chemical 
Engineering 
g6. Dept. of Water and Sanitation s6. Univ. KwaZulu-Natal; Development 
Studies 
g7. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife s7. Univ. KwaZulu-Natal; Geography 
g8. Fibre Prod. & Manuf. Skills 
Education Training Authority 
s8. Univ. Pretoria; Forest Science 
Postgraduate Programme 
g9. Industrial Development 
Corporation 
s9. Univ. Stellenbosch; Dept. of Forest and 
Wood Science 
g10. National Forest Advisory 
Council 
s10. Univ. Venda; Dept. of Forestry 
g11. South African National 
Biodiversity Institute 
s11. Univ. Witwatersrand; School of Animal, 
Plant and Environmental Sciences 
x1. Forest Sector Charter Council 
(not interviewed) x3. South African Water Research 
Commission (not interviewed) x2. South African National Parks 
(not interviewed) 
Interest groups Businesses 
i1. Chemical, Energy, Paper, 
Printing, Wood & Allied Workers’ 
Union 
b1. Merensky 
i2. Food & Allied Workers’ Union b2. Mondi/Zimele 
i3. Forest Industry Training 
Providers Association 
b3. MTO 
i4. Forestry South Africa b4. NCT Forestry Co-operative 
i5. Paper Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa b5. PG Bison 
i6. Sawmilling South Africa b6. R&B Timber Group/Masonite 
i7. South African Utility Pole 
Association 
b7. Rance Timber/Amathole Forestry 
Company 
i8. South African Wood Preservers 
Association 
b8. SAFCOL/Komatiland Forests 
i9. South African Forestry, Farming, 
Catering & Allied Workers’ Union b9. Sappi 
i10. South African Forestry 
Contractors Association 
b10. Timrite 
b11. TWK Agri 
b12. York Timbers 
Civil society Other 
c1. Association for Rural 
Advancement 
o1. Fort Cox College of Agriculture and 
Forestry; Dept. of Forestry 
c2. GeaSphere 
o2. KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform 
Beneficiaries/SiyaQhubeca Forests 
c3. Forest Stewardship Council 
Africa 
o3. SA Forestry Magazine 
c4. Lima Rural Development 
Foundation 
o4. Wood SA & Timber Times 
c5. Timberwatch Coalition 
x4. Southern African Institute of Forestry (not 
interviewed) 
c6. Wildlife and Environment 
Society of South Africa  
c7. World Wide Fund for Nature 
South Africa 
Note: “Civil society” refers to non-governmental organisations with environ-
mental and/or social focus; “interest groups” refer to both industry associations 
and labour unions; “other” includes two sector-specific media representatives, 
an educational institute, and a group of land reform beneficiaries. 
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All interviews were transcribed before manually coding them using 
Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld, 2010) – a software tool designed 
for Discourse Network Analysis (DNA). DNA combines qualitative con-
tent analysis with social network analysis to create relational data on 
actors’ ideational alignment (Leifeld, 2017). To analyse raw text data, 
what must be coded are statements: portions of text where actors state 
their views about different themes in a positive or in a negative way. 
Each statement is attributed to an actor and a belief is then identified by 
the coder. The coding was conducted inductively, with the coder navi-
gating back and forth between the statements to ensure consistency. The 
first author, who collected the data and was most familiar with the case, 
was the unique coder. This was a labour-intensive strategy, but avoided 
concerns over intercoder reliability. 
The coding yielded 656 statements, which we then categorised as 
being one of 40 different beliefs about policies. They all fall under one of 
the levels of the ACF belief system. This paper focuses on twelve of these: 
(i) stances for and against three policy core beliefs, and (ii) stances for 
and against three beliefs about policy instruments (Table 2). Statements 
that fall under these twelve beliefs account for 33 % of all the statements 
made during the interviews with elites (see also the supplementary file). 
Choosing beliefs about policy instruments for the analysis was rela-
tively uncomplicated: an actor either supports or opposes a policy in-
strument. Choosing the policy core beliefs was less straightforward. We 
focus on beliefs that revealed actors’ causal assumptions, problem per-
ceptions, and normative orientations, the latter of which are largely 
beyond direct empirical challenge (Sabatier, 1988, p. 110). For example, 
we identified beliefs about the necessity, principles, and validity of 
existing environmental policy. Additionally, none of the elites may have 
openly opposed the moral justification of land reform in South Africa, 
but they may have had very different beliefs about under what cir-
cumstances it should advance (i.e., who retains control of those lands). 
Most importantly, we chose the beliefs that the largest share of actors 
made statements either in favour or against, meaning that they were the 
most salient issues in the subsystem. 
The DNA tool represents the relationship between actors and their 
beliefs as ties in a binary affiliation matrix, where actors and beliefs are 
distinct modes. To determine how far “ideational alignment” is present 
in this structure, we transformed these data into a weighted adjacency 
matrix, where actors connect to one another and where ties represent 
the number of shared beliefs. The contention that we make is that the 
more beliefs that any pair of actors share, the more similar their set of 
beliefs (Leifeld, 2017). 
We collected relational data during the interviews by presenting the 
roster of network actors to each interviewee and then asking them to 
indicate which actors they recognised as information exchange partners. 
To control for the voluntary nature of information exchange, represen-
tatives were asked to tick an ‘only when necessary’ option where 
applicable. In addition, we asked them to rank how highly they trusted 
those organisations that they identified as information exchange part-
ners on a five-point scale, from zero to complete. Finally, we asked the 
representatives to indicate which actors they considered to be especially 
influential. The cut-off point for past interactions was set at the last three 
years. 
We used these data to construct another weighted adjacency matrix, 
which captures the voluntary exchange of information with trusted 
partners (four or five on our five-point scale), where actors connect to 
other actors and where the ties represent the intensity of the connection 
(0=disconnected; 1 = non-reciprocal tie; 2=reciprocal tie). As a form of 
co-ordination, information exchange may be less intensive and less risky 
than alternative forms, such as collaboration. However, the psycholog-
ical safety brought about by trusting somebody enables the willing 
contribution of one’s ideas and actions to collective effort (Edmondson, 
2004). We therefore regard this operationalisation as a proxy for 
collaboration. 
We use the software package Gephi to conduct our network analysis 
(Bastian et al., 2009). For the three undirected and weighted networks, 
we applied the Louvain algorithm to determine how well the resulting 
networks decompose into communities of densely connected nodes, 
with nodes belonging to different communities being only sparsely 
connected; differences are usually meaningful when the resulting 
“modularity” value exceeds 0.4 (Blondel et al., 2008) (see the supple-
mentary file for more details). 
5. Results 
5.1. Contribution of shared policy core beliefs to coalition formation 
Network X in Fig. 2 shows how actors divide into two communities, A 
and B, with more ties inside the communities and fewer between them. 
Where a tie between two actors in the network is present, it indicates 
that they share at least one of the three policy core beliefs. The modu-
larity value for this network is 0.42, which suffices to establish that there 
is a line of division between these communities. We can therefore 
identify two competing coalitions based on policy core beliefs. We can 
validate this finding by comparing the members of these communities to 
those present in the co-ordination network Z (Fig. 2; Table 3). The 
modularity value for this network is lower, 0.27, but the actors falling 
into communities E and F are largely the same as the ones detected in 
communities A and B, respectively. 
We provide further evidence of the existence of these coalitions by 
describing their composition and characteristics. There is a minority 
“justice and change” coalition (JAC; 36 % of actors) that challenges the 
ideas of the hegemonic “business-as-usual” coalition (BAU; 64 % of 
Table 2 
Policy beliefs included in the analysis.  
Type Statements 
POLICY CORE BELIEFS 119 (55 %) 
Environmental regulation 
c1a "In its current form, is contradictory, unfair, and harmful – 
must become more consistent and less costly" 
28 (13 %) 
c1b "In its current form, is imperative, yet not necessarily sufficient 
to sustain our delicate environment – must become more 
effective through better resourcing and enforcement" 
15 (7 %) 
Social costs of tree plantations 
c2a "Despite externalities, social benefits of plantations through 
the value chain outweigh their social costs" 
28 (13 %) 
c2b "Social costs of plantations outweigh their social benefits, 
which is why their existence must be questioned" 
13 (6 %) 
Decolonisation through land reform 
c3a "Land reform must happen to drive decolonisation in South 
Africa, although the current models tend to reproduce past 
injustices by favouring existing elites" 
18 (8 %) 
c3b "Land reform can happen as long as it does not lead to 
abandonment or conversion of that land" 
17 (8 %)  
BELIEFS CONCERNING POLICY INSTRUMENTS 99 (45%) 
Voluntary certification to sustainability standards 
i1a "Voluntary sustainability standards improve sustainability and 
should be promoted" 
10 (5 %) 
i1b "Voluntary sustainability standards favour those who focus on 
exporting and promotes illogical or unsustainable practices" 
10 (5 %) 
Multi-functionality of tree plantations 
i2a "Multi-functional and community-based growing of trees come 
with high uncertainty and concerns over economies of scale" 
14 (6 %) 
i2b "Plantations can and should be managed for multi-functionality 
to be more sustainable, although it might come at the expense of 
short-term economic gains" 
15 (7 %) 
Eastern Cape expansion 
i3a "Consequences of Eastern Cape expansion can be socially and 
economically positive, provided that communities receive 
support from industry and the government" 
29 (13 %) 
i3b "Consequences of Eastern Cape expansion would be socially and 
environmentally negative, which is why it is likely that it will 
not happen" 
21 (10 %) 
POLICY BELIEFS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 218 (100 
%)  
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actors). The core actors within each coalition tend to agree on several of 
the three policy core beliefs and form stronger ties, as illustrated by the 
relative width of the ties in the network, while others with a more 
specific focus occupy auxiliary roles. 
Table 3 presents the profiles of opinion over the three policy core 
beliefs. It shows that the members of the BAU coalition are rather 
consistent in expressing their beliefs. The members of the JAC coalition 
are less unanimous with regard to the validity of environmental regu-
lation. We thus find some actors at the border of this coalition because 
they share some beliefs with actors in the BAU coalition. However, we 
observe steep polarisation in terms of beliefs concerning the social costs 
of tree plantations and decolonisation through land reform. 
The BAU coalition includes some actors with very high reputational 
influence scores. A majority (65 %) of the other organisations in the 
network perceive the tree growers’ interest group as being especially 
influential. Businesses, two of which are global pulp and paper giants, 
and private sector interest groups, including those of sawmillers, paper 
manufacturers, and treated wood product manufacturers are also 
members of this coalition. The coalition also includes focal government 
departments – that is, those of trade and industry and of agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries. We also note that the incumbent labour unions, 
with long histories in South Africa, whose interests lie in creating and 
maintaining jobs, are in agreement with several businesses and state 
interests at an ideational level. This “iron triangle of power” is present in 
the coalition that defends the existing social order and prioritises eco-
nomic values and industrial modes of production over environmental 
values and principled moral conscience. A number of scientific organi-
sations in this coalition are also tied to the industry through funding. 
These include institutes with a relatively narrow focus that are highly 
relevant for the industry, including those concerned with enhancing (or 
maintaining) the productivity of mills and plantations. 
The BAU coalition is primarily unified by the belief that tree 
plantations provide important economic opportunities through the 
manufacturing of wood-based commodities. All actors are rather cog-
nisant of the environmental issues in relation to the growing of alien tree 
species and their effects on streamflow and biodiversity. Nevertheless, 
such externalities are seen as manageable and the overall benefits of the 
practice are perceived as outweighing social costs. Regarding land re-
form, the actors acknowledge the need to redress past injustices, but 
given the situation where their own existence is threatened, they appear 
to pre-empt risks and advocate for the maintenance of the redistributed 
lands in tree production at all cost. However, most of the actors in the 
coalition contend that the environmental regulations that cover the 
sector are complex, costly, illogical, and contradictory, and are not 
backed by scientific evidence. The following quote exemplifies this. 
“We know there are limits to how much we can grow given the water, 
discourse in South Africa. But we’re seeing two things: one, catchments that 
the Department of Water and Sanitation say are closed, because all the water 
is allocated. When they do the compulsory licensing process, they find that 50 
% in most cases, of the water that is allocated on paper, to farmers, is not 
being taken up. But in those situations you can’t apply for water use license 
for timber, that’s the very first thing. And so we’re being unnaturally con-
strained, because government believes there’s a water scarcity in the country, 
and there is in some cases different interpretations. In other cases, we’re 
scarce on paper, in practice the rivers are pumping into the sea, which as a 
colleague of mine said is full enough as it is. So that’s an issue for me is that 
there is a constraint to growth, physical expansion of the plantations in South 
Africa, that is built on constructs that are not scientifically defensible.” [In-
terest group] 
The interviews also brought up some underlying tensions within the 
BAU coalition. A fracture lies in the debate over the conversion of grown 
species from pine to eucalypt, which complicates sawmillers’ raw ma-
terial procurement. Many of the actors associated pine growing and 
sawmilling with broader beneficiation than the processing of eucalypt 
Fig. 2. Communities identified in networks 
based on shared policy core beliefs (A and B), 
shared beliefs concerning policy instruments (C 
and D), and co-ordination (E and F). The 
smaller co-ordination networks with blue nodes 
at bottom left and at bottom right mark the 
deviancies in community division between 
networks X and Z as well as Y and Z, respec-
tively. The node size reflects the logarithm of 
each actor’s reputational influence (i.e., num-
ber of recognitions of being especially influen-
tial). The node label reflects the actor type: a 
business (b); a civil society organisation (c); a 
government department or agency (g); an in-
terest group (i); a scientific organisation (s); or 
some other type of organisation (o). To match 
labels with organisations, see Table 1.   
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into fibre before exportation. For some, this was understandable due to 
the lucrative export markets for fibre, while others blamed environ-
mental regulations for creating the current zero-sum situation. None-
theless, actors in this coalition engage in co-ordinated activity (as shown 
in Fig. 2 as the abundance of thick reciprocal ties among them) and are 
able to influence policy both formally and informally. It also appears 
that they have managed to translate their beliefs into policy, in the form 
of the Forest Sector Code of 2009 and the Amended Forest Sector Code of 
2017. 
The JAC coalition represents a minority of the actors in the network, 
and its members are not entirely unified in their beliefs. Some organi-
sations agree with the members of the BAU coalition who contend that 
environmental regulation of the industry is inconsistent and unbalanced 
in comparison to other sectors that are not subject to similar fees and 
licensing. The core of the JAC coalition consists of civil society organi-
sations and the government departments in charge of implementing and 
enforcing environmental regulation, including those responsible for 
environmental affairs, water, and sanitation. The mandates of these 
departments differ to those of the government departments in the BAU 
coalition. Civil society organisations are also divided into those that 
emphasise the environmental problems, but are willing to work with the 
members of the other coalition to find solutions (which has also led to 
accusations of them being co-opted by the BAU coalition). A few others 
that operate at the grassroots level (i.e., those making the accusations) 
focus on revealing social injustices and mobilising resistance against 
what they see as the destruction of the environment for the benefit of a 
privileged few. Members of the JAC coalition do not co-ordinate with 
one another as closely as those in the BAU coalition do (Fig. 2), as 
explained by the relatively low modularity value for the co-ordination 
network. The JAC coalition critiques the status quo and advocates for 
policy change (ranging from reform to revolution), grounded in the 
universal principles concerning environmental and social justice. The 
actors in this coalition generally tend to question the very existence of 
the industry because of its social costs, which they argue exceed its 
benefits, exemplified in the following quotes. 
“But I think the major barrier, is assuming the failure of industry to realise 
just how bad the situation is specifically with pines and to a degree euca in the 
mountainous areas. So the key mountains are eight percent of the land pro-
ducing 50 % of the water, and if they get covered by invasions they’re not 
going to produce much water. And they’ve gotta understand that if the in-
vasions carry on the way that they are in the Southern Cape, we would have 
no option but to either bring in biological control to kill the pines, or look at 
some gene drive option, to do so which we would think in, the latter case that 
they would need to pay for. But that could destroy the forestry industry.” 
[Government department] 
“So, I think at the first level, is to say that, hang on, we need to ask the 
question about is this an industry that we simply want to grow. […] OK, let’s 
presume they pay their taxes. So what? Do we really have to allow them a free 
hand? Whereas if we can have alternative economic activities, some of which 
may include sustainable forestry, in a mix of land use, why not? So, as far as 
we can see, this is a predatory industry. It makes profits for few people. It 
doesn’t employ vast numbers of people, and it has major negative social, 
economic and rights impact. So they can keep their profits as far as we are 
concerned. Their profits don’t contribute anything. Their profits are their 
profits. This is not an industry that really has much of a leg to stand on to say, 
it actually is doing something socially useful, environmentally progressive or, 
yeah.” [Civil society organisation] 
At the border of the two coalitions is a group formed by four tradi-
tional leaders and their subjects in the northern KwaZulu-Natal prov-
ince. They have been returned former government-owned plantation 
land, which they have been managing in collaboration with a business 
actor and a government department under the auspice of a partnership 
model of land reform. Although they do not really co-ordinate with the 
members of the JAC coalition, their beliefs place them in it. For example, 
they prioritise the vital environmental functions of their lands over 
(externally-imposed) short-term economic goals. 
Although traditional leadership under customary law is a constitu-
tionally recognised level of government in South Africa, we were not 
able to identify any organisation that would have collectively repre-
sented traditional leaders in the context of national tree plantation 
politics. Overall, rural communities, as the ones living with the impacts 
of tree plantations, whether positive or negative, are not well- 
represented in the policy subsystem. Labour unions and civil society 
organisations voice concerns on their behalf, but the communities 
themselves are neither well-organised nor well-recognised. 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for the analysed networks.  
NETWORK X. SHARED POLICY CORE BELIEFS Modularity value: 0.42 




in community A 
Number of 
endorsing actors 
in community B 
Number of 
endorsing actors in 
the network/ 
subsystem 
c1a 23 5 28 
c1b 1 14 15 
c2a 26 2 28 
c2b 0 13 13 
c3a 2 16 18 
c3b 16 1 17 
Actor type Number of actors 
in community A 
Number of actors 
in community B 
Number of actors 
in the network/ 
subsystem 
Business 12 0 12 




5 6 11 
Interest group 9 1 10 
Scientific 
organisation 
8 3 11 
Other 1 3 4  
NETWORK Y. SHARED BELIEFS CONCERNING POLICY INSTRUMENTS Modularity 
value: 0.51 




in community C 
Number of 
endorsing actors 
in community D 
Number of 
endorsing actors in 
the network/ 
subsystem 
i1a 3 7 10 
i1b 4 6 10 
i2a 11 3 14 
i2b 5 10 15 
i3a 29 0 29 
i3b 0 21 21 
Actor type Number of actors 
in community C 
Number of actors 
in community D 
Number of actors 
in the network/ 
subsystem 
Business 7 5 12 




10 1 11 
Interest group 9 1 10 
Scientific 
organisation 
2 9 11 
Other 3 1 4  
NETWORK Z. CO-ORDINATION Modularity value: 0.27 
Actor type Number of actors 
in community E 
Number of actors 
in community F 
Number of actors 
in the network/ 
subsystem 
Business 12 0 12 




4 7 11 
Interest group 8 2 10 
Scientific 
organisation 
9 2 11 
Other 3 1 4  
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5.2. Contribution of shared beliefs concerning policy instruments to 
coalition formation 
The modularity value for the network based on beliefs about policy 
instruments is relatively high at 0.51. Therefore, beliefs about policy 
instruments also divide actors into two communities, pictured as C and D 
in Fig. 2. However, after comparing the actors in these communities to 
those identified in the co-ordination network (E and F, respectively), we 
find that these beliefs neither strongly contribute nor are the result of 
coalition formation. The actors support the same instruments for 
various, often conflicting reasons, suggesting that they are unlikely to 
form broad united fronts to advocate for or against specific policy in-
struments. However, this does not exclude the possible contribution of 
beliefs about policy instruments to the formation of factions within co-
alitions. We therefore cannot identify competing coalitions based on 
shared beliefs about policy instruments. Rather, policy instruments find 
both support and opposition across coalition lines. The following qual-
itative analysis substantiates this argument. 
The achievements of eco-certification as a policy instrument in 
improving management practices in South Africa since 1997 are well- 
recognised. However, actors disagree about their future use. The civil 
society organisations that are willing to work with industry actors 
defend such voluntary self-regulation as a means of continuous 
improvement and as a window for dialogue. Their grassroots counter-
parts accuse the eco-certification schemes of certifying something as 
‘sustainable’ which they view as fundamentally unsustainable. Busi-
nesses with a more local focus are among those who oppose eco- 
certification, but only because they view the standards as economi-
cally illogical. For them, certification is an unnecessary and costly form 
of environmental regulation. These actors are keener to adopt an eco- 
certification where standards are developed and enforced by the in-
dustry. Hence, while actors unite in resistance, the arguments underly-
ing their positions are, to some extent, filtered through their deeply held 
beliefs. 
The same pattern applies to the policy instrument of multi-functional 
management, which government agencies and many scientific and civil 
society organisations favour to enhance the social acceptability of tree 
plantations. While some businesses favour this approach and report 
having made their premises accessible to livelihood practitioners and 
recreationists, others oppose multi-functionality because they believe it 
is too risky to grant public access to plantations and because they believe 
it is not economically viable. Others challenge this short-term view by 
stating that granting the public access, promoting local control of the 
resource, and conserving biodiversity will pay off in the long term 
through avoided sabotage and sustained productivity. 
Opinions on Indicative zoning of Eastern Cape explain much of the 
relatively high modularity value of the network constructed on the basis 
of shared beliefs concerning policy instruments. This can be explained 
by the fact that each organisational elite was asked specifically to 
comment on this instrument. Thus, everyone expressed their beliefs 
concerning it – but two groups of actors who were against this instru-
ment based their beliefs on very different reasoning. The debate over 
indicative zoning has been welling for years, with little development on 
the ground. Many actors across coalition lines reject this instrument 
because they think it is simply not feasible: they believe that the 
remoteness, weak infrastructure, and ownership issues cannot be over-
come. They have also learned from the past failed attempts to implement 
this instrument. However, this places them in the same community in 
the network with those who reject the instrument on the grounds of their 
policy core beliefs opposing plantations in the first place. Those resisting 
the instrument on the grounds of their deeply held beliefs base their 
argument on their experiences of plantations elsewhere in the country. 
Those in favour of the instrument are the businesses that focus on local 
markets, interest groups that have advocated for an expansion in plan-
tation extent for years, and, notably, every government department. 
Given that the Eastern Cape region lags in socio-economic indicators and 
its degraded lands are perhaps unsuitable for competing land uses, even 
the departments that would generally be very critical of plantations 
support the instrument. 
“I think in some areas it’s actually a positive step. In parts of the Eastern 
Cape, particularly the former so-called homeland areas the land is very 
degraded, and we’ve got to look pragmatically at what is the best land use 
practice, and it might be that in those areas the growing of invasive or pref-
erably less invasive species would be an advantage, something, that we would 
support and, where we believe, that the industry could do well enough out of 
that, going forward. […] My sense in all these things is that the full set of costs 
must be picked up by those who wanted to profit from the use of an invasive 
species, and it’s a challenge.” [Government department] 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In the face of unprecedented pressures on land use systems across the 
globe, coalitions of policy actors can foster or hinder, if not reverse, the 
changes in policies and practices that are needed to change the course of 
our currently irrational global production ecosystems. Building on the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), we set out to study the highly 
conflictual politics of tree plantation policy in South Africa to determine 
the extent to which (i) general policy core beliefs and (ii) specific beliefs 
about policy instruments underpin coalition formation. We achieved 
this using network data collected through 55 interviews with organ-
isational elites. 
Advocacy coalitions consist of actors who share a particular belief 
system and who show a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over 
time (Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). The relative contributions that the two 
different sets of policy beliefs play in coalition formation has been 
subject to an enduring debate among those applying the ACF (Weible 
et al., 2019). The results of our analysis of South African tree plantation 
politics show that beliefs about policy instruments play a significantly 
weaker role in coalition formation than policy core beliefs. The network 
that we created from actors’ shared stances for or against a set of three 
policy core beliefs divided the actors into two communities, which 
largely overlap with the two communities observed in the co-ordination 
network. Conversely, the two communities that we find by examining 
actors’ stances on a set of three policy instruments do not overlap with 
those that we observe in the co-ordination network. The set of policy 
instruments that we analysed, including eco-certification, multi-func-
tional management, and indicative zoning for the establishment of new 
plantations, found support across coalition lines. 
The ACF, rarely utilised in African contexts, functioned well as a 
framework for our analysis of the tree plantation politics of South Africa. 
Regarding the empirical question about the number and characteristics 
of coalitions in this turbulent policy context, we found two competing 
coalitions: the hegemonic business-as-usual (BAU) coalition and the 
minority justice and change (JAC) coalition. 
We found that two coalitions hold diverging beliefs over a set of three 
policy core beliefs: the principles and validity of existing environmental 
regulation, the balance of social costs and benefits of tree plantations, 
and the conditionality of using land reform within the wider process of 
decolonisation in South Africa. The BAU coalition connects selected 
business and state interests with labour arguments and prioritises eco-
nomic efficiency over environmental sustainability and social justice. 
Similar coalitions that have assumed a hegemonic position have been 
found to hinder pro-environmental or pro-social policy change in 
various other environmental and land use policy processes (Di Gregorio 
et al., 2017; Gronow and Ylä-Anttila, 2016; Kröger and Raitio, 2017; 
Sabatier et al., 1995; Wagner and Ylä-Anttila, 2018). The relatively 
weak JAC coalition challenges the dominant paradigm by questioning 
the existence of tree plantations on South African soils. These coalitions 
are in line with those that Tewari (2001) identified in the aftermath of 
the changes that took place in South Africa in the nineties. However, our 
network analysis provides an updated portrait of the actors, issues, and 
ideological polarisation inside the tree plantation politics of South 
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Africa. 
A curious feature of the tree plantation policy subsystem is the 
absence of any actors representing the rural communities that are often 
the most severely affected by land use and land use change. This differs 
from similar contexts, such as Brazil, where strong pressure from the 
Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) and neutral parties was instru-
mental for changing the policy landscape (Ghinoi et al., 2018; Kröger, 
2011). This may be due to the inability of the post-apartheid state to 
establish itself, both politically and economically, in the South African 
hinterlands, which has allowed traditional leaders to recast themselves 
as decision-makers on behalf of sizeable communities (Koelble and 
LiPuma, 2011). An earlier analysis of tree plantation politics in South 
Africa has also revealed that policy actors who co-participate in focal 
policy forums (i.e., collective decision-making institutions) tend to build 
trust and forge relationships of political nature (Malkamäki et al., 2019). 
Much of the coalition building and the mechanisms that make coalitions 
self-reinforcing are thus bound to occur in such forums, meaningful 
participation in which requires actors to have resources that rural 
communities in South Africa rarely possess. 
Our findings support the central claim of the ACF that shared policy 
core beliefs are the “stickiest glue” that hold advocacy coalitions 
together. Our results provide evidence that beliefs about policy in-
struments occupy an inferior position in the belief hierarchy of the ACF. 
However, contradictory results have been found elsewhere (Ingold, 
2011; Metz et al., 2019; Tewari, 2001; Zafonte and Sabatier, 1998). This 
leads us to call for the clarification of the conceptual foundations of the 
ACF to better account for the conditions under which beliefs about 
policy instruments are significant contributors to coalition formation. It 
may be the case that lower sanctions for coalition defection, weaker 
path-dependencies, and an early introduction of one or more in-
struments in the policy process facilitate such conditions. 
In one of his expositions of the ACF, Sabatier (1998) stated that 
preferences concerning instruments may produce such an effect if they 
share the crucial characteristics of policy core beliefs, such as being 
broad in scope, involving resistant beliefs, and having been the source of 
protracted conflict. The instruments that we considered, especially 
eco-certification and zoning, largely meet these criteria. However, we 
did not identify coalitions based on the similarity of actors’ beliefs on 
these issues. If learning occurs through policy implementation or there is 
a novel instrument to begin with, policy instruments may act as a means 
for reconciliatory interactions across coalition lines (Jasny et al., 2018; 
Sotirov and Winkel, 2016). 
Our study has several limitations. The data collection in 2017 
occurred at the peak of protracted economic stagnation and uncertainty 
about the future, during which the views across coalition lines could 
have become even more polarised. Most actors, including governmental 
ones, expressed frustration and discontent with the political leadership 
at the highest level. We used open-ended questions to measure policy 
beliefs, which meant that the interviewed elites gave varying degrees of 
detail in their answers. This approach allowed them to express concerns 
that mattered the most to them. It also provided a realistic view of the 
debates in which they were most engaged. Core actors focused on 
several issues, whereas others assumed more specific or more auxiliary 
roles. With only a few statements that were made by the elites that we 
interpreted as deep core beliefs, it could be argued that our approach 
was not necessarily ideal for eliciting such fundamental beliefs. Testing 
and developing measurement scales to expose beliefs at the deepest level 
of the belief system is a potential alternative (de Witt et al., 2016; Rip-
berger et al., 2014). 
Through our analysis of actors, beliefs, and coalition formation in 
South African tree plantation politics, we identified two competing co-
alitions in this conflict-stricken setting. Additionally, we have illumi-
nated the causal mechanisms for self-organised coalition formation 
under conflict and uncertainty, thereby contributing to the clarification 
of the conceptual foundations of the ACF. There is a need to continue 
testing the mechanics of the ACF in diverse empirical settings and to 
refine the framework accordingly. Inside tree plantation politics in 
South Africa, media debates warrant more attention. Such analyses 
could focus on emerging issues, such as the possible contribution of tree 
monocultures to aggravated wildfires and baboon damages (Germi-
shuizen et al., 2017; Kraaij et al., 2019). The recently enacted policy 
packages, the “land expropriation without compensation” and the car-
bon tax, are also worth exploring. 
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Bodin, Ö., Galaz, V., Folke, C., 2019. Anatomy and resilience of the global 
production ecosystem. Nature 575, 98–108. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019- 
1712-3. 
Peffley, M.A., Hurwitz, J., 1985. A hierarchical model of attitude constraint. Am. J. Pol. 
Sci. 29, 871. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111185. 
Pierce, J.J., Peterson, H.L., Jones, M.D., Garrard, S.P., Vu, T., 2017. There and back 
again: a tale of the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Stud. J. 45, S13–S46. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12197. 
Pilling, D., Bélanger, J., Hoffmann, I., 2020. Declining biodiversity for food and 
agriculture needs urgent global action. Nat. Food 1, 144–147. https://doi.org/ 
10.1038/s43016-020-0040-y. 
Rahlao, S., Mantlana, B., Winkler, H., Knowles, T., 2012. South Africa’s national REDD+
initiative: assessing the potential of the forestry sector on climate change mitigation. 
Environ. Sci. Policy 17, 24–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2011.11.013. 
Ripberger, J.T., Gupta, K., Silva, C.L., Jenkins-Smith, H.C., 2014. Cultural theory and the 
measurement of deep core beliefs within the advocacy coalition framework. Policy 
Stud. J. 42, 509–529. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12074. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1987. Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change: an 
advocacy coalition framework. Sci. Commun. 8, 649–692. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
0164025987008004005. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1988. An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of 
policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sci. 21, 129–168. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
BF00136406. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1993. Policy change over a decade or more. In: Sabatier, P.A., Jenkins- 
Smith, H.C. (Eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach. 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 13–39. 
Sabatier, P.A., 1998. The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for 
Europe. J. Eur. Public Policy 5, 92–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
13501768880000051. 
Sabatier, P.A., Weible, C.M., 2007. The advocacy coalition framework: innovations and 
clarifications. In: Sabatier, P.A. (Ed.), Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado, pp. 189–220. 
Sabatier, P.A., Hunter, S., McLaughlin, S., 1987. The devil shift: perceptions and 
misperceptions of opponents. West. Polit. Q. 40, 449–476. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
106591298704000306. 
Sabatier, P.A., Loomis, J., McCarthy, C., 1995. Hierarchical controls, professional norms, 
local constituencies, and budget maximization: an analysis of U.S. Forest service 
planning decisions. Am. J. Pol. Sci. 39, 204–242. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111764. 
Samways, M.J., Pryke, J.S., 2016. Large-scale ecological networks do work in an 
ecologically complex biodiversity hotspot. Ambio 45, 161–172. https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/s13280-015-0697-x. 
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